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Abstract 
Within an established body of literature, a number of studies have sought to apply quantitative 
frame works, such as cross-country regression analyses, to ascertain the importance of potential 
drivers for trade. However such approaches are not without difficulties, particularly where different 
elements may interact or may have a questionable relationship with trade, resulting in calls for 
country specific experiences to be scrutinised.  In response to such comments this paper examines 
existing literature on three historical case studies reflecting specific regions, commodities and 
timeframes in order to ascertain if established drivers were relevant and what important additional 
elements may be at play. This paper includes an examination of the inter-related economic and 
political factors which have been identified as influencing how trade has changed. The results 
confirm the importance of elements such as economic growth, openness, geography and transport 
costs but helps contextualise some of the high level drivers identified in the literature.  This analysis 
affords three main conclusions, firstly distinct trading regions may react differently to similar 
circumstances, secondly, policies which can influence both supply and demand can have a significant 
impact on established trade patterns and finally initially isolated elements can (with the benefit of 
hindsight) prove to have had a significant impact on trade 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 The quantity of material traded globally has dramatically increased over 30 fold since 1950 [1]. 
During this period trade has developed within the context of globalisation, reflecting the greater 
interconnectedness along supply chains, with cross-border investment flows [2].  Whilst this period 
arguably reflects the second age of globalisation, the scale of modern trade flows, and the speed 
with which information is exchanged, means that globalisation in the 21st century bears little 
semblance to globalisation in the 19thor early 20th.  
 
 
1.1 The foundation of modern globalisation. 
 
Arguably the current age of globalisation originated in the frameworks (and subsequent agreements) 
initially established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The first agreement 
signed in 1947 arrived at a set of rules to govern how trade is conducted between contracting 
parties [3]. Furthermore it allowed for a multilateral forum for negotiating reciprocal reductions in 
barriers to trade, necessitating contracting actors to ideally treat goods coming from contracting 
parties indiscriminately [4].  
 
The period following the establishment of the initial GATT agreements (subsequently replaced by 
the World Trade Organisation) oversaw the post-war reindustrialisation of key trading regions such 
as Japan, Western Europe and (arguably to a lesser extent) the United States (US), with a significant 
increase in the quantity of material traded by these regions, particularly energy commodities. The 
international demand for goods these economies produced had a significant impact on the increase 
in trade and was supported by the high ratio of investment to GDP in such regions [5]. These 
industrialised economies were impacted by the crises of the 1970 and the 1980s whilst that period 
also saw the emergence of newly industrialised countries such as Korea, Singapore Taiwan etc. The 
development of these emergent economies has been attributed to a move from initial policies of 
import substitution to more open trade. The 1980’s also saw the emergence of containerisation 
which grew significantly in the following decades as the trade in intermediate goods increased in 
tandem with extension of supply chains and continued investment in Asian economies. The 
subsequent decades continued the Asian ascendancy with significant growth in the trade of 
containerised goods but also the emergence of China as one of the largest importers of bulk goods 
[6]. 
 
However the apparent dividends of globalisation have not manifested equally amongst all 
developing countries, with regions such as Africa being comparatively slower to build on and 
enhance existing competitive advantages [7]. More generally the structure of world trade has moved 
to one of greater parity in the trade of primary and manufactured goods between developed and 
developing regions (with the arguable exception of Africa) as well as a significant increase in the 
trade between regions in the developed world [8].  
2.1 What drives or hinders trade: some high level perspectives. 
The changes in the global summarised in the previous section have prompted significant effort 
within both the economic and policy literature to account for why and how trade has grown by such 
an extent. From a high level theoretical perspective the growth of word trade in industrialised 
countries has been attributed to economic growth and increases in income levels. The view 
presented by some commentators is that highly industrialised countries with a surplus output of 
high value goods are more likely to find a market in other highly industrialised countries [3]. 
Furthermore these frameworks assume that such regions will have a greater capacity to source 
cheaper primary goods. 
Contrasting frameworks seek to explain the challenges faced by developing nations in replicating the 
economic growth of developed nations, in terms of lacking the capacity to respond to industrialising 
stimuli or not being sufficiently competitive [3]. The growth of emerging markets is seen as reflecting 
the presence of more advanced economies which supply the ‘economic preconditions’ for trade 
growth in the form of capital, technology, knowledge, which support the emergence of modernizing 
elites who replicate the structures of more advanced trading partners. 
2.2 Aims of this paper 
The debate as to what ultimately drives trade has continued since the 1950s. As will be discussed 
later in this paper, despite significant advances in analytical techniques, the importance of 
fundamental elements, such as the openness of national markets, have arguably not been 
incontestably established. The conventional theoretical perspective ultimately viewed trade as a 
derived demand, in the absence of activities having an origin and destination, transportation 
becomes meaningless [9]. However additional literature reminds us that the complexity of modern 
trade cautions against a simplistic view of derived demand and that where and when trade is 
manifested will depend on numerous factors which are region and commodity specific [10]. 
Therefore this paper makes use of high level historical case studies of regional trading patterns, 
informed by literature, to ascertain the political and economic factors which have been deemed to 
have influenced not just changes in the demand for important traded commodities but also how the 
demand was met. This is based on the view as expressed in [11] on the value in studying specific 
country/regional experiences as a tool for understanding trade. Given that the shipping sector has 
been responsible for transporting the vast majority of goods traded globally, special consideration 
will be given to the role occupied by shipping [4].    
The case studies seek to identity linkages between individual elements and recognise that the 
impact of an individual driver will not be felt in isolation, as proposed by [12] who suggest that, for 
example, the impact of trade liberalization is increased if it is accompanied by other regulatory 
reform. Authors such as [13] argue that international trade policy is closely linked with other 
policies. We are reminded that polices which in hindsight are deemed to have had a positive impact 
on trade may have been inappropriate under different circumstances and advocates studies which 
attempt to contextualise such issues [14]. Given their heterogeneity, these specific examinations  
should not be taken to produce generalizable accounts [15] but can highlight  variables whose wider 
relevance can be tested using a more structured method such as econometric cross country 
regression analysis. 
3.0 What are the factors which influence trade?  
Broadly speaking the literature presents a number of factors which are considered to have an impact 
on trade and are summarised in Table 1, with some key factors expanded in the following section. 
This section will also comment briefly on the method used within the literature to ascertain how the 
impact of such proposed drivers are tested.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.1 Trade and growth 
The positive correlation between international trade and economic growth remains in many cases a 
“statistical regularity in need of explanation” [16, p 30]. Despite this, the view that economic growth 
invariably has a positive influence on the rate of trade growth is not incontestable. In particular the 
bi-relational nature of trade and economic growth makes it difficult to arrive at a conclusive picture, 
whilst trade can have a significant impact on economic growth, so can many factors that can be 
related to trade [17]. Specifically, studies such as [16] describe the complexities involved in 
determining causality, particularly in distinguishing precedence and correlation. However the 
authors provide the caveat that demonstrating a robust relationship between trade and growth and 
demonstrating how trade affects growth are separate issues. For example using a simultaneous 
equation model to test competing hypothesises [18] suggests that investment, technology 
transmission and a stabilisation of macro-economic policies are the most important effect of trade. 
(The latter reaffirms the suggestion that trade may affect growth through other institutions).  
3.2 Policy relevant interventions 
Broadly speaking this section will comment on some of the factors, over which trading regions have 
political control. 
3.2.1 Openness to trade 
In terms of policy, [19] discuss previously published empirical work (such as cross-country regression 
analysis) which suggests openness to trade is a significant explanatory variable for the level (or 
growth rate of) trade and real per capita GDP. Trade openness/liberalization is a broad term which 
can refer explicitly to the modification of tariffs, quantitative restrictions or voluntary export 
restrictions. For example studies such as [20] employ a theoretical general equilibrium model of 
international trade in final goods suggesting that trade liberalization has contributed 75% of the 
(approximately) 2% average annual growth of world merchandise trade (as a % of income)  between 
the late 1950s and the late 1980s. However reviewing the growth in real bilateral trade flows 
between 16 OECD countries suggests that 67–69% of the observed growth over this period could be 
explained by growth in real GDP, 23–26% by preferential trade agreements and tariff-rate reductions 
whilst 8–9% of this growth can be explained by reductions in transport-costs. In many respects this 
reflects the movement away from policies of import substitution whereby countries adopt foreign 
exchange and import controls to safeguard their export earnings and enabling available foreign 
exchange to be used strategically. However this approach of import substitution was reassessed by 
many countries (including newly industrialised countries) following the 1980s economic crisis [21], 
who adopted polices which promoted export orientated industries, including modification to 
subsidies and tariffs etc. Studies such as [22] find that foreign direct investment (FDI) is closely 
correlated with trade liberalization. However it should be mentioned that the use of cross country 
regression analysis to suggest a positive link between trade/growth and openness has been criticised 
[13, 17] as some of the variables used may have dubious relevance to trade policy or the 
relationships are invalidated by the inclusion of alternative variables. More recent empirical 
evidence demonstrates a positive but significant variability in the extent to which trade growth 
responds to trade liberalization [23, 24].  
3.2.2 Regionalisation 
In a related point to the issue of trade openness is the issue of regionalisation whereby a group of 
(often geographically proximate) countries adopt a regional free trade area, custom union or 
common market [5]. On the one hand, regionalisation allows circumvention of the ‘no new 
preferences rule’ enshrined by the GATT agreements. Alternatively proponents of regionalisation say 
that regionalisation can speed up or act as stepping stones towards greater trade liberalization.  
3.2.3 Aid 
Foreign aid is a contentious issue, particularly in relation to whether aid is tied to other 
commitments. However, foreign trade has been suggested to mitigate the poor export performance 
of some developing countries by allowing them to import larger quantities of manufactured goods 
(often from industrial countries) than would be possible given their normal trading position [3].  
3.3 Issues of Geography 
Moving away from areas of direct relevance to trade policy, other commentators have suggested 
alternative determinants which may impact upon trade. Comparing trade of different commodities 
between New Zealand, US and Latin American countries, by means of one and multi-sector 
monopolistic competition models [25] suggest that distance, language and adjacency effects are 
significant factors for the trade of certain goods. The issue of time, transport costs and geography 
appear to be perhaps unsurprisingly interconnected. For example, it was estimated by [26] that 
transport and freight insurance costs were approximately double for landlocked countries as 
opposed to coastal countries. Speaking in terms of Central Asian countries [27] suggest overland 
transportation costs, bargaining posture with, and infrastructure of, transit countries are important 
variables. The importance of both port and transit infrastructure is reiterated by [28], suggesting 
that a median landlocked country exhibits only 30 % of the trade volumes of the median coastal 
economy. 
Other studies [29] suggest the negative affect of distance on trade peaked at the middle of the 
century and has remained persistently high. However we are reminded [30] that changes in 
transport technology means that distance is not a static variable and will be impacted by 
transportation technologies. This is important considering some studies do not distinguish between 
transport modes. Time series regressions of bilateral trade and suggest the relative importance of 
distance by air has been increasing while the importance of distance by sea is in decline, although 
the authors present a caveat in querying whether trade is the only bilateral factor shaped by 
distance [30].  
In a related point, [31] states that lengthy shipping times impose inventory-holding and depreciation 
costs on shippers. On average, increasing shipment duration by one day reduces the probability of 
trade by 1%. However confining the analysis to manufactured material suggests that increasing 
transit length has a positive but marginal effect on trade. This would seem to be at odds with the 
assessment presented in [29], arguably reflecting the impact of distinguishing commodity types. 
It is argued that studies which examine customs data consistently find that transportation costs 
represent a barrier that is comparable or greater than that of tariffs [32]. The authors suggest that 
prices for ocean shipping changed marginally from 1952–1970, exhibited significant increases from 
1970 to the mid-1980s, followed by a steady 20-year decline. While ships have become larger and 
more efficient, the economics of trade have changed as well. Increased fuel costs (amongst other 
reasons) has meant that the proportion of shipping to total costs have not decreased drastically. 
Furthermore when measured relative to the commodity price deflator, the cost of shipping a ton of 
ore has decreased the cost of shipping a dollars’ worth has not. Other authors [33] suggest that the 
impact over time of maritime transport costs is diminishing over time while the distance effect 
(which is seen as a proxy for a range of determinants) is generally rising.  
 
Results 4.0 
4.1 Choice of chase studies 
Trade exists at the nexus between supply and demand therefore it is argued here that in choosing 
case studies there is value is representing different commodities, industrial sectors, time periods and 
regions. Similarly the policy or economic factors which will affect trade may be proactive or more 
reactionary. For these reasons three historical case studies are presented. 
 1960s-mid 1980s: The impact of the oil crises on the trade of crude oil to the United States: 
Western Europe. 
 1960-1970s: Raw material supply strategies adopted by Japan. 
 1980-2000: The growth of containerised trade particularly between the US and Asia. 
These case studies were also chosen as they were deemed to have had global relevance beyond the 
regions directly impacted [4].  
4.2 The response to the oil crisis. 
In the 1960’s the demand for oil by the US and Western European economies increased significantly, 
due to increasing demand in the energy and transport sectors.  In the US this was a consequence of  
policies which incentivised suburbanisation (such as development of the highway system and 
underwriting mortgages for suburban one family homes [34, 35] During the 1960’s air quality 
legislation prompted new power plants to be designed for oil or gas. Whilst the US remained a 
significant producer of oil during this period, the growth in demand outpaced production. In 1969 
the quota system which restricted the amount of Middle-Eastern oil allowed into the United States 
was eliminated due to rising oil prices and quota loopholes [36]. Indeed the Suez Canal closing in 
1967 prompted the beginning of a buoyant seven years for ship owners as large tankers were in high 
demand to sustain European and American demand [4].  
In Western Europe the growth in the transport energy demand resulted from growth in income as 
well as the greater availability of consumer instalment purchases for motor vehicles. However in 
quantitative terms the demand for oil by the power sector was of greater importance, within 
European OECD countries the proportion of oil in non-transport energy demand doubled  between 
1960 to 1973 [37]. The inability of European coal mines to expand quickly enough meant that oil 
became a more attractive choice for the power sector. The European Coal and Steel community 
allowed oil companies to plan large-scale, inter-state oil refining and transportation infrastructure.  
Underpinning this demand was a growing dependence on Middle Eastern sourced oil. The scale of 
available oil reserves and the complex arrangement between oil companies and exporting countries 
ensured the capital necessary to established large scale exporting infrastructures [38, 39]. 
Competition between exporting regions kept prices at a low level and by 1970, imports were 
approximately 13% and 80% cheaper than European domestic gas and oil respectively [40].   
Objecting to their political stance during the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973, key Arabic 
members of OPEC imposed an embargo on exports to the US and its allies in Western Europe, 
precipitating a significant increase in the price of oil. In response the European council agreed upon 
a set of dedicated policy objectives which highlighted energy security concerns and adopted an 
action program for the 'rational utilisation of energy.’ This manifested as inter-state cooperation in 
energy savings measures, diversifying sources of energy and exploitation of domestic energy [41] to 
enhance self-sufficiency. Between 1974 and 1981 the quantity of oil consumed in the EC declined 
from 587 to 464 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) with the net import dependency declining 
from 98 to 77% [42]. 
As a response to the embargo US refiners affected short-term changes in oil sourcing, looking to 
import crude oil from any available source. Furthermore between 1973 and 1975 the US sought to 
protect and regulate the domestic oil industry through differing pricing structures which 
differentiated their exposure to the international market [36]. However this policy incentivised 
hoarding as long-term contract prices did not rise to meet spot prices and (after modification in 
1975) acted as a mild incentive for oil companies to increase purchases of imported crude oil [43]. 
Crude oil imports more than doubled from 1973 to 1977, reaching a record level of 6.6 million 
barrels per day in 1977 and stagnated until 1979 [44]. 
With the additional increased prices following the Iranian revolution in 1979 further measures were 
required. The early 80's witnessed European governments offering more favourable terms for 
companies which were (or intending to) explore and produce oil in the North Sea. These factors 
meant that, along with the associated economic downturn and continued efforts towards efficiency, 
between 1980 and 1990 the quantity of crude oil unloaded at ports in developed European Market 
economies decreased from 586 to 447 Mt [8] (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 about here 
The further increase in oil price provoked earlier regulation of the US domestic oil industry to be 
largely abandoned which prompted increased domestic production whilst additional exporters (such 
as Nigeria and Norway increased market share). This resulted in a decline in crude imports up to the 
mid-1980s after which they increased sharply along with the general economic recovery and a 
reduction in import prices [44] (See Figure 2).  
Figure 2 about here 
4.3 The Japanese bulk supply strategy 
A key element of Japan’s post war industrialisation was government support for the automotive 
industry which saw the production of 4.1 million cars in 1968 with 85% of which being used 
domestically [45]. Trade liberalization was deferred until 1965 by which time domestic industry 
could compete effectively. However the resources for large scale investment did not present 
themselves until the 1970s. Prior to the mid 1960’s the US was the main coal exporter, however 
Australian coal mines signed contracts to export 3 Mt pa of metallurgical coal from New South Wales 
during the initial years of the 1960s. In the following decade this established a framework for state-
sector-firm cooperation [46]. Specifically this resulted in Japanese steel mills signing long-term 
contracts with mines and making small equity investments (e.g. in infrastructure) to simultaneously 
provided a lever to drive down market prices [47]. Such clauses provided incentives and guarantees 
to mining firms to undertake capital intensive investments, based on assuming low profit returns as 
investor expectations reflected the need to reliably secure low cost, high quality (large quantity) coal 
supply. A feature of this model was implicitly fostering competition between potential exporting 
regions further incentivising the investment in infrastructure at port and mine level as well as linking 
infrastructures.  
A similar narrative is evident for ore imports. By 1960 Malaysia, India, Peru, Brazil, South Africa and 
Chile were the primary sources of Japanese ore. It was also recognised by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) that the output of the largest suppliers would inevitably 
decline [48]. What became termed the “the steel-ship nexus” referred to cooperation between the 
state, steel and shipping companies and allowed the Japanese Steel Industry to overcome and 
arguably benefit from the large distance between trading partners. State support allowed Japanese 
shipyards to build specially designed and strengthened ships (itself increasing ore demand) in the 
late 1960s [46]. Some Japanese mills owned their own ships which allowed material to be 
transported on a free-on-board (FOB) basis such that any reduction in transport costs were captured 
by Japanese importers. (An important factor following the increase in marine fuel prices following 
the oil crisis.) Practices such as triangular trading patterns (whereby a ballast voyage is employed 
between two laden legs) allowed markets such as Brazil, which previously were considered too 
distant, to be exploited. By 1970, ore sourced by such contracts accounted for over 90% of Japanese 
ore imports. Such plans had two main outcomes; firstly they established important key trade 
partners such as Brazil and Australia who although unimportant by 1970 would become significant in 
the following decades [49]. Secondly, the pattern of state-sector-firm relations and the resultant 
learning, organizational, technological innovations established a framework which was replicated by 
other steel and coal sectors in other countries.   
4.4 The growth of containerisation 
Given that containers are not strictly commodities types in that they do not serve a consumer use in 
and of themselves, the growth of containerisation arguably represents a closer association of supply 
and demand based issues. This has been linked to increasing disposable incomes and an increasing 
demand for variety with increasing intra-industry trade between countries producing similar goods 
and services [50]. Similarly containerisation has facilitated the extension and fragmentation of 
supply chains allowing for manufacturing to benefit from regional specialisation or comparative 
advantage. It has been suggested that sectors that produce and export sophisticated goods, such as 
consumer electronics, tend to have a higher foreign content (in terms of value added) than other 
sectors [51].  
The emergence of the modern container industry arguably owes its existence to the collapse of the 
tanker ship building sector following the oil crisis of the 1970s [4]. To compensate for the reduced 
tanker ship demand, shipbuilders began offering more favourable terms for new containerships 
which traditionally were more expensive given the intensive use of steel and labour in the 
construction. This was significant in that it allowed for the entry of companies which were later to 
play a major role (such as Maersk) as well as making larger, cellular containers more affordable [52].  
The growth of containerisation is inextricably linked to both port terminal and inland infrastructure. 
Key US policy changes in the 1980 eased the extent to which containers could be transported by rail 
or by trucks, including as back hauls [52]. This coincided with the expansion of the “just in time” 
manufacturing process in the US, thereby enhancing the predictability afforded by containerisation 
[53]. In particular in 1980s the development of the US land bridge (e.g. express container rail 
services) were seen as providing a crucial link between economic hubs in the US and those in 
Industrialising Asia, particularly when using the Panama Canal incurred considerable delays [54].   
The growth in manufactured goods also reflects the greater trade liberalisation that intensified in 
the 1990’s with many industrialising East Asian countries continuing to enact policies favouring 
export led growth [55]. Increasingly complex feeder services were introduced to link the regional 
ports to key hub ports of Hong Kong, Singapore. Sequential currency appreciation in industrialised 
countries (e.g. Japan, Korea) incentivised the outsourcing of labour intensive manufacturing 
processes to nearby regions with lower labour costs, many of which replicated the process [56]. For 
example Japan reconfigured it’s manufacturing sector during the 1990's by establishing production 
processes in other countries, mainly China and ASEAN countries, from where, in-turn, exports were 
shipped to established trade partners in Europe and North America [57]. Between 1995 and 2000 
the transpacific container trade grew by 78 and 58% for eastbound and westbound container trade 
respectively, whilst inter-Asian trade increase by 53% [58] (See Figure 3). The construction of 
substantial ports in China, Thailand etc. during the 1990s was perceived as an investment in 
globalization [52].  
Figure 3 about here. 
5.0 Discussion  
Perhaps the most fundamental challenges faced by econometric assays of the relationship between 
trade and other elements such as openness, growth, etc., is the issue of multi-colinearity, an existing 
degree of linear dependence between variables. This is elucidated by stating that as trade policy and 
(crucially) its outcomes, are likely highly correlated with additional facets of growth, it is difficult to 
determine what really matters [19]. Indeed [30] argues that a wider interpretation of such analyses 
suggests that trade is best viewed as a proxy for a number of bilateral interactions and phases of 
economic integration that are susceptible to different factors such as investment, and information 
exchange etc. Some of the issues raised in the above cast studies, are summarised in Table 2 along 
with related factors which are suggested by the case studies to impact on how such drivers (or 
indeed barriers) are manifested.   
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
5.1 The relevance of case studies 
The presented case studies should not be interpreted as invalidating or contradicting the 
determinants presented earlier in this paper, and whilst specific examples arguably provide little 
generalizable insight, they do however contextualise how these factors which have been manifested 
in these instances. 
One of the issues illustrated by the above case studies, is the potential impact of polices outside the 
trade sphere. For example policies in the US in the 1950s leading to suburban housing, infrastructure 
and increased car ownership have been identified as contributing to the demand for oil in later 
decades, as domestic production could not keep pace with demand.  
Furthermore a historical focus can distinguish some of the specific inter-relationships between trade 
and non-trade policies [14]. In the 1960s European regionalisation allowed oil transport and refining 
infrastructure to be planned across national boundaries and enabled crude oil to be transported in 
large quantities, which accentuated the economic competitiveness of cheap oil from the Middle 
East. What has been highlighted is the potential impact of policies which enhance or diminish 
personal purchasing power (such as credit availability, mortgage underwriting) or control the extent 
to which global price fluctuations are passed on the domestic/consumer market. For example the 
(de)regulation of the US domestic oil sector strongly influenced the relationship between levels of 
domestic production, global oil prices and the competitive advantage of externally sourced oil. 
The second case study demonstrates how both government and industry policy sought to be 
proactive in mitigating the challenges posed by future supply constraints, commodity costs, and 
distance and in doing so distort the distinction between supply and demand. Government support 
(e.g. deferred trade liberalization) and industrial rationalisation in the 1960’s allowed industrial 
capacity to be established and (subsequently) compete internationally. Concurrently government 
encouragement for steel firms to invest in the ship building industry enabled the common interests 
of the Japanese steel, shipping and shipbuilding sectors (all dependent on imported material) to be 
protected from wider market fluctuations. In this instance the ability of industrial and government 
policy to identify and capitalise upon co-benefits is important. The capacity to build larger and more 
robust vessels or vessels suited to triangular routing would not be possible without securing a supply 
of ore and coal. 
Arguably the growth of containerisation represents a clearer indication of the impact of time and 
distance as the initial motivation for its growth was the uptake of just-in-time process configuration 
which made time a significant decision in the sourcing of material. A range of policy and macro-
economic factors (currency, trade liberalisation) incentivised the extension of different segments of 
the manufacturing supply chain across “Factory Asia.” This would not have been possible without 
adequate infrastructure, in particular the establishment of infrastructure which supported a “hub 
and spoke” configuration of trade, linking smaller ports to the larger ports which serve the deep sea 
markets.  
Of greater value in reviewing the historical case studies is that they contextualise the difficulty in 
conclusively generalising the factors which drive or impede trade. It is impossible to divorce the 
decisions which impact trade from the time and region where they made. For example the first oil 
crisis demonstrates how diverse importing regions made different choices in response to similar 
constrains. The US sought to secure short term sourcing of fuel, increased imports and (in a 
relatively short time frame) returned to a high dependency on the Middle-East, while European 
importers effectively reduced import dependency through focusing on energy efficiency as well as 
domestic production. This is key as both regions collectively represented a significant proportion of 
the global oil trade prior to the crisis. Both these examples, as well as the bulk/supply strategy 
adopted by Japan demonstrate how similar motivations (in this case security of supply) can manifest 
in very different policies and trade practices. This will reflect not just economic differences but also 
differences in geography, such as the domestic availability of resources. 
6.0 Conclusion 
Despite significant advances in terms of the methods applied, establishing the linkages between 
trade, its consequences and determinants, remains a difficult prospect. Critics of established 
econometric studies are quick to reinforce that this is a response to the complexity of the problem, 
particularly in relation to the issue of multiple variables impacting upon each other.  A number of 
different high level drivers (or indeed barriers) have been identified in the literature but the context 
in which they may interact is often unclear. By presenting 3 different case studies this paper does 
not seek to invalidate such factors but rather present some contextualisation for how different 
policy, economic or geographical factors may manifest in changes in trade patterns. These case 
studies, particularly when viewed as part of a narrative, demonstrate how non-trade policies can 
impact upon the eventual demand for a commodity. However such interactions can often depend on 
wider fluctuations in commodity prices or economic growth. At the risk of simplification, three broad 
observations can be made.  
Firstly, distinct trading regions may react differently to similar circumstances, as seen in different 
responses to the first oil crisis. Secondly, policies which can influence both supply and demand for a 
commodity can have a significant impact on established patterns of trade as seen in the cooperation 
that allowed the Japanese steel-ship nexus. Finally apparently isolated elements can (with the 
benefit of hindsight) prove to be connected, such as the role of the oil crisis in enabling larger, 
cellular container ships and new companies to enter the market. Whilst accepting the difficulty in 
proving counterfactuals (i.e. it cannot be proved that similar outcomes would not emerge from 
different circumstances), the use of such limited narratives reaffirm that the concept of derived 
demand cannot be viewed as static and it is difficult to decouple the choice of where, when or how a 
commodity is traded from why it is traded in the first instance.  
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Table 1: Factors which may act as a barrier or a driver for trade. Based on literature sources. 
Name Examples Comment 
Trade Policy Relevance 
Trade liberalization Easing of tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions or quotas, etc. 
Contested topic, significant econometric 
work suggested it is beneficial but these 
have been questioned. 
Regionalization Establishment of trade area, 
custom union or common 
market 
Seen by some as way to circumvent trade 
liberalization. 
Protectionism Explicit measures which limit 
the effects of competition such 
as sector specific subsidies. 
Most relevant for agricultural 
commodities. Critics argue it has led to 
surplus stock and trade disputes. 
Embargos Explicit injunctions against 
trading with specified partners. 
Comparatively rare but can have 
significant consequences. 
Foreign Aid Direct subsidies to producers in 
developing nations. 
Concerns over the extent to which trade 
can be tied. 
Economic Development 
Economic 
Growth/income 
growth and 
convergence 
Increased economic activity, 
disposable income. 
Generally not contested in broad terms 
but specifics can vary. Income convergence 
normally associated with growth of 
manufactured goods. 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Directly investing in companies 
based internationally. 
Often dependent on additional macro-
economic factors. 
Import 
substitution/export 
promotion 
Extent to which domestic 
industries are sheltered from 
wider competition. 
Close overlap with wider issues of 
protectionism and trade liberalisation. 
Costs differential Ability to offer comparative 
advantages in product or labour 
costs. 
Likely to be influenced by stage in 
industrial development as wages improve 
and currency strengthens. 
Institutions The presence of stable political 
and regulatory structures which 
inform policy and gather 
information.  
Institutions seen as important mediators 
between national and international 
institutions and facilitators of inter 
sectorial cooperation. 
Other issues 
Infrastructure The extent of cargo handling The existence of bottlenecks can impede 
capacity at ports or the quality 
of transit routes. 
trade or reduce additional competitive 
advantages. 
Distance Increasing distance seen as an 
impediment to trade 
Some disagreement amongst 
commentators and the affect likely to be 
commodity dependent. 
Time Shippers willing to pay for more 
timely transit. 
Does interact with modal choice and issues 
of distance and transport costs. 
Transport costs The various costs associated 
with movement of freight 
including fuel, insurance etc. 
Reflects impact of both technological 
improvements but also associated fuel 
costs such as fuel. 
Sea border Direct access to seaborne trade Lack of sea border increases the 
importance of inland infrastructure and 
permeable borders. 
 
Table 2 Supplementary factors which may influence trade, based on historical case studies. 
Name Comment linkages 
Trade Policy Relevance 
Security of Supply Political motivations to ensure specific 
sectorial demands are met, including 
stockpiling. Can result in contrasting trade 
practices and increase or decreases in trade. 
Import dependency, 
efficiency measures, 
economic growth. 
Import dependency Increased self-sufficiency through reduction in 
imports or increases in domestic production. 
May not result in an absolute trade reduction. 
Security of supply, 
commodity price, distance.  
Economic measures and policies 
Efficiency measures 
or environmental 
policies 
Dedicated measures to reduce material or 
energy inputs for key industries, or reduce 
their environmental impact. 
Commodity price, 
regionalisation, 
security of supply, 
regionalisation 
Personal purchasing 
power 
Range of options which enhance the ability of 
individuals to acquire goods and services for 
example enhanced credit availability. 
Income growth and 
convergence,  transport 
costs 
Currency appreciation Increasing the value of a currency incentivises 
outsourcing of labour intensive supply chain 
segments. 
Income growth, FDI, Trade 
liberalization 
Sectorial 
(de)regulation 
Broad category reflecting the establishment or 
relaxing the specific rules which govern 
individual sectors such as pricing structures, or 
the movement of material and capital 
between sectors.     
Dependent on context can 
link to issues of price, trade 
liberalization and domestic 
production. 
Substitutability  The commodities which have the capacity to 
be substituted to provide the same service. 
This can influence the extent to which 
domestic commodities can compete with 
imports. 
Domestic production, 
commodity costs, industrial 
rationalisation. 
Inter-sectorial 
investment 
Policies which incentivise related sectors 
investing in each other in order to mitigate 
risks or mitigate costs. 
Distance, transport costs, 
commodity costs, sectorial 
regulation. 
Other issues 
Freight 
Policy/regulation 
The rules which determine how freight is 
moved particularly inter/intra modal linkages. 
Distance, transport costs, 
commodity costs, 
regulation 
Infrastructure 
investment 
Investment in both ends of the supply chain as 
well as the linkages between manufacturing 
centres and transport hubs. Includes port 
expansion/development. 
Freight policy, distance, 
transport costs, commodity 
costs, regulation, industrial 
rationalisation, 
regionalisation, trade 
liberalization, domestic 
production. 
Industrial 
rationalisation 
Modernisation of industrial processes to 
incorporate additional technologies and 
relocation of manufacturing centres to 
integrate with transport hubs. 
Freight policy, distance, 
transport costs, commodity 
costs, infrastructure 
investment. 
Domestic production The domestic production of commodities and 
the extent to which domestic production can 
satisfy overall demand.  
Security of supply, 
commodity price, distance, 
import dependency, 
substitutability. 
 
 
Figure 1: Crude oil (Mt) unloaded in developed European market economies taken from [8]. 
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 Figure 2: Total US crude imports (million barrels per day) 1970-1977, taken from [44].  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Transpacific trade in twenty foot equivalent (TEU) container units 1995-2012 taken from [58]. 
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